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Abstract: Foreign policy is essentially about the projection, protection, realization and 
advancement of the national interest of a state. But has that been the case with Nigeria? 
This paper examines Nigeria’s foreign policy under Olusegun Obsanjo’s administration 
(1999-2007). It focuses on the strength of Nigeria’s foreign policy and what the country 
was able to gain in the period under review. Primary and secondary data, scooped from 
interviews, books, journals, newspapers, magazines, and internet materials were used. 
Descriptive-analytical method was engaged in the discourse. Findings show that the 
administration of Obasanjo used Nigeria’s external relations as a platform to cancel 
Nigeria’s external debt, encourage foreign investment, improve the telecommunication 
sector, and also mediate in conflict areas in Africa. But it is also noted that there was 
no ideal structure for foreign policy making and implementation. Therefore, it is 
recommended that for Nigeria to be able to use foreign policy for her benefit, the 
structures and institutions responsible for foreign policy making and implementation 
must be strengthened and fertilized to grow, which is largely made possible when 
structures and institutions are manned by skilled or knowledgeable personnel.  
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Introduction 
Nigeria‟s relationship with the 
outside world started long before 
independence in 1960, under the 
colonial government, during which 
dependent Nigeria had no separate 
foreign policy outside of the British 
(Shitta, 2010). During this time, the 
interest of Her Majesty, the Queen of 
England was the interest of the 
colonial Nigeria. The British colonial 
government, through its Governor-
General administered Nigeria‟s 
foreign relations, which manifested 
in several ways, including the control 
of international trade, determination 
of import and export duties for 
Nigerians, use of British colonial 
offices in other countries as bases for 
carrying on with external relations, 
sending of Nigerian soldiers to fight 
in the Battle of Burma during the 
First World War, among other 
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developments (Idang, 1977; 
Chibundu, 2009). 
 
On attainment of independence, the 
first distinct phase of Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy was the Balewa era, 
from October, 1960 to January, 
1966. In their stock-taking and 
analyses of the outlook of Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy, King (1998), Fawole 
(2003), and Saliu (2006) reach a 
consensus that the basic principles of 
the country‟s foreign can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Non-alignment with any of 
the then existing ideological 
and military power blocs, 
especially NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact; 
2. 2. Respect for the legal 
equality, political 
independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all 
states; 
3. Respect for the doctrine of 
non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of all other 
states; 
4. Seeking membership of both 
continental and global 
multilateral organizations for 
their functional importance to 
Nigeria; and  
5. That Africa would be the 
cornerstone of the country‟s 
external relations. 
 
These principles form the core areas 
of Nigeria‟s relations with other 
countries of the world since 
independence. King (1998) in 
particular posits that the continuity 
of the country‟s foreign policy is 
rooted in the basic principles that 
have guided its relations with the 
community of nations. These 
principles are consistent with the 
eclectic ideological framework 
which informs her policy. They are 
geared towards protecting and 
advancing Nigeria‟s national interest. 
Every head of government or of state 
has accepted their validity, although 
the style and vigour with which each 
pursued them have differed 
significantly.  
 
King (1998) goes to further assert 
that, all of these five principles 
provide a basis for formulating, 
executing, and justifying specific 
foreign policy objectives and the 
actions taken to achieve them. They 
constitute guidelines that the 
interested public may use to evaluate 
particular foreign policy behaviour. 
In addition, these principles integrate 
the eclectic ideological influences of 
nationalism, pan-Africanism, 
Marxism, and capitalism into an 
ethical framework that defines the 
purpose of action and the limits of 
objectives in foreign affairs. They 
form the moral fabrics of Nigeria as 
she interacts with the world. Indeed 
they are pathways informing the 
basic currents and the process that 
shape choices in foreign policy 
matters (King, 1998).   
 
Based on the foregoing, this paper 
examines Nigeria‟s foreign relations 
under Obasanjo‟s administration 
(1999-2007) with emphasis on 
national development. Both primary 
and secondary data were used for the 
analysis of this paper. The primary 
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data were principally information 
from a one-on-one interview with 
former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, and the secondary data 
were from books, journals, 
monographs, conference papers, 
newspapers and magazines. This 
paper comprises four segments. The 
first part comprises the introduction; 
part two attempts a theoretical 
discourse; the third part discusses the 
political and economic situation of 
Nigeria and its foreign policy under 
the Obasanjo government; part four 
conclude the study. 
 
Theoretical Linkage: The Rational 
Actor Model  
Nigeria‟s foreign policy during the 
Fourth Republic was anchored on the 
national development of the state 
through the identification of the 
needs of the state and setting out of 
goals to achieve them. It has been 
contended that the era was that in 
which Nigeria acted intelligently on 
the global platform and that it was 
the personal knowledge, experience 
and charisma of Obasanjo that 
significantly accounted for the 
attitude of the Nigerian State during 
that period (Fawole,2004). In line 
with this, the rational-actor model of 
decision-making theory is being used 
to discuss in this paper. 
 
According to Adeniran (1983), 
decision –making focuses on the 
individual statesman. When 
individual decision-makers are the 
focus, their idiosyncrasies, values, 
motivations and ideals are examined, 
particularly, as they relate to their 
leadership style as decision-makers. 
Their goals or choice of objectives as 
well as expectations are analyzed to 
determine the policies of state. This 
is because state action is considered 
to be that which is taken by the 
decision-makers acting in the name 
of the state.  
 
Amstutz (1999) posits that the 
rational-actor model involves 
identifying interests and goals in 
making and implementing foreign 
policy, by developing a strategy for 
achieving goals and successfully 
implementing policy. According to 
this model, states behave in 
purposeful ways, seeking to 
maximize short and long-term goals. 
International relations is not random, 
unintelligible interactions among 
states, but are rooted in the goal-
oriented choices and actions of 
political communities. If the foreign 
relations of states were totally 
random and irrational, the study of 
foreign affairs would be impossible. 
Indeed, because states are assumed 
to behave in intelligent and 
purposeful ways, the analysis of 
foreign policy is possible. 
 
The rational-actor model, according 
to Amstutz (1999) assumes that 
states are coherent actors that seek to 
maximize their interests by rationally 
weighing the costs and benefits of 
alternatives. Some of the major 
elements of the rational-actor model 
are: 
    1.Problems are defined thoroughly 
and accurately. 
    2. National goals and interests are 
identical, especially in light of 
defined problems. 
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    3.  National goals and interests are 
prioritized. 
    4.  Alternative strategies for 
pursuing goals are identical. 
    5.  Policy alternatives are assessed 
in light of potential 
consequences. 
    6. The optimum strategy is 
selected in light of anticipated 
policy outcomes (Amstrutz, 
1999). 
Amstutz, (1999) also identifies the 
following limitations of rational 
actor model, namely:   
1. The model assumes that states 
behave as coherent actors. Countries 
are viewed as communities ruled by 
a cohesive, well organized 
government in which the decision 
making process is regarded as a by-
product of deliberate and rational 
assessment. But governmental 
decision making is not carried out by 
a single individual or a unified, 
coherent organization. Rather, it is 
undertaken by numerous officials, 
each representing a variety of 
political and governmental agencies, 
and representing interests and 
perspectives that are not necessarily 
complementary. Indeed, decision 
making is frequently a slow and 
cumbersome process because of 
conflicts among officials, groups, 
agencies, and governmental 
institutions involved in the formation 
of policies. 
2. The model assumes that decision 
making is based on a rational 
dispassionate assessment of long-
term, strategic interests. In effect, it 
assures that governments pursue the 
national interest. But decision 
makers are seldom motivated solely 
by the general, future interests of the 
state. Because governmental decision 
making is the result of a multitude of 
agencies and organizations, each 
with its own particular interests, 
foreign policy is often the product of 
limited and short-sighted interests of 
people and organizations. In effect, 
government officials do not always 
pursue public policy with dispassion. 
Sometimes they place their personal 
or institutional loyalties above the 
general interests of the nation. 
3. The model assumes that decision 
makers have adequate time and 
information on which to make 
rational choices. Accurate, 
dispassionate goal setting and goal 
implementation requires reliable 
information. It also presupposes time 
to analyze and prioritize alternative 
strategies. But governmental 
decision making is often undertaken 
with limited information and under 
severe time constraints. Despite 
efforts to gain as much information 
about the interests and capabilities of 
other states, information about 
foreign governments is always 
incomplete. Moreover, decision 
making is often undertaken under 
time constraints, especially during 
international crisis. As a result, 
foreign policy decision making is 
generally incomplete. 
4. The model does not take into 
account the role of misperception. 
Foreign policy decision makers act 
according to their perceptions, not in 
light of reality itself. Because 
people‟s psychological 
preconceptions serve as lens for 
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filtering data, ideological leanings 
can easily distort reality and this, in 
turn, can impair governmental 
decision making. Misperception 
decreases the availability of accurate 
information and impairs the analysis 
of goals and strategies. Thus, when 
external stimuli are distorted, sound, 
dispassionate decision making 
becomes difficult, if not impossible.    
 
Despite the demerits the rational-
actor model in explaining this study, 
it is still very relevant in its analysis 
of this paper; it focuses on the 
decision makers identifying the need 
of the state by setting up goals to 
achieve them. According to 
Olusegun Obasanjo (2014) the goals 
or objectives that the state wants to 
achieve determines government line 
of actions and steps to be taken. 
 
Contexts of Nigeria’s Foreign 
Policy in the Fourth Republic 
This section will be examining the 
political and economic situations in 
Nigeria and foreign policy under the 
Olusegun Obasanjo administration 
between 1999 and 2007. This is with 
the view to determining the premises 
of Nigeria‟s foreign policy during 
the time as well as the foreign policy 
direction and actions at the time. 
 
Political and Economic Situations 
in Nigeria 
The political and socio-economic 
situations in Nigeria in the period 
before civilian administration in 
1999 debased Nigeria and the 
country assumed a pariah status 
among civilized countries in the 
world. Incidents such as corruption, 
mismanagement of public fund, June 
1993 elections annulment, hanging 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni 
activists in November 1995, 
detention of members of opposition 
groups and state-sponsored 
assassination squads, among others, 
attracted strong international reaction 
and sanctions. These included 
Nigeria‟s suspension from the 
Commonwealth, imposition of a 
travel embargo on key officials, 
cancellation of military contacts and 
embargo on sale of arms to the 
country by the western countries 
(Alao, 2011). 
 
According to Alao (2011:23) the US 
had also imposed a travel ban and 
sanctions on the Abacha regime for 
hanging the Ogoni activists in 1995. 
These activists and their leader, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa were hanged because 
their persistent campaign against 
social injustice and pollution of the 
environment was at variance with the 
interest of oil multinational 
companies and the Nigerian 
government. The US ban on the 
Abacha regime won the support of 
civil society activists in the country, 
but brought the regime in clear 
opposition to the US government. 
However, the confidence of Nigerian 
civil society groups in the US 
suffered when Moshood Abiola, the 
winner of the annulled June 1993 
election, died after a meeting with 
US officials under circumstances 
many in Nigeria considered 
suspicious (Alao: 25). 
 
On the economy, Nwachukwu (cited 
in Ofose, 2014) has blamed the 
current economic woes of the 
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country on the administrations of 
President Shehu Shagari (1979-
1983) and retired General 
Mohammed Buhari (1983-1985) 
while seemingly exonerating the 
Ibrahim Babangida‟s eight years of 
administering the country‟s economy 
from any wrongdoing. 
Nwachukwu (cited in Ofose, 2014) 
in his words noted, 
Nigeria‟s image attained it lowest 
ebb during the years of Abacha‟s 
misrule. General Abacha‟s poor 
and, one could say with the 
benefit of hindsight, disastrous 
political decision-making during 
his leadership between 1993 and 
1998, contributed to the 
production of the most negative 
image that Nigeria had ever had. 
By 1995, that Abacha‟s 
administration committed its 
greatest and gravest mistake. After 
summary trial, Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and 8 other Ogoni activists were 
executed. International 
condemnation soon followed. 
Many countries, decided to 
intentionally shy away from 
interaction with Nigeria. Abacha‟s 
Nigeria lost all respect and 
consideration in international 
politics, and the severity of the 
Ogoni activists‟ execution led to 
countries‟ withdrawal of their 
ambassadors and head of mission 
and some closed down their 
diplomatic missions in Nigeria.  
 
However, this position of 
Nwachukwu has been flawed (Ofose, 
2014), with the genesis of corruption 
and Nigeria‟s low image in 
international politics squarely laid on 
the Babangida administration. 
According to Osadolor (cited in 
Ofose, 2014) Nigeria‟s economic 
crisis rightly began with the 
Babangida administration, and got 
worse when his regime introduced 
policies such as Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) and 
other anti-socio-economic policies. 
 
Foreign Policy under Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s Administration (1999-
2007) 
At the return of democratic rule in 
1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 
emerged as the civilian president and 
at the onset of this new 
administration, resuscitation of the 
economy for the well-being of the 
Nigerian people was identified as a 
central platform for sustainable 
democratic order. It was however, 
widely acknowledged that to 
reposition the Nigerian economy for 
the desired growth, issues such as 
declining Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI),the debt problem and 
repatriation of ill-gotten wealth must 
be appropriately addressed (Folarin, 
2014). 
The desire to balance the domestic 
and external contexts necessitated an 
initial foreign policy that required 
extensive outreach diplomacy during 
the early years of the Obasanjo 
administration. Indeed, between May 
1999 and mid-August 2002, 
Obasanjo embarked on 113 foreign 
trips, spending 340 days out of the 
country (Akindele, 2003). In 
explaining his reasons for 
undertaking the trips, Obasanjo 
stated: 
I have devoted much time and 
energy journeying virtually all 
corners of the globe in my personal 
effort to positively reintegrate our 
country into the international 
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community and attract investment. 
We are happy to report that the 
results from these trips have been 
encouraging enough to confirm my 
personal belief and the advice of 
marketing experts namely that 
personal contact is the best way to 
market your product. And my 
product is Nigeria (Obasanjo, cited 
in Akindele, 2003). 
 
President Obasanjo and Alhaji Sule 
Lamido, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs travelled extensively in 
Africa, Europe, Asia and the 
Americas to promote Nigeria‟s 
bilateral relations, even at the 
expense of very strong criticisms of 
the President‟s “excessive” overseas 
tours (Chibundu, 2009).   
 
In an extensive oral interview with 
Obasanjo, an insight into he took 
stock of his administration‟s 
achievements on the external plane. 
These can be summarized thus: 
 
Conflict Resolution 
The administration made attempts to 
restore confidence and credibility to 
Nigeria's contribution to the 
prevention, management and 
resolution of various conflicts in 
Africa and elsewhere. At the Algiers 
Summit of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) in 1999, 
Obasanjo's proposal that the year 
2000 be made the Year of Peace, 
Security and Solidarity was adopted 
by the Summit. Also in September 
1999, during the fourth extra-
ordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, 
Libya, Obasanjo's proposal for the 
convening of a Ministerial 
Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development and Cooperation in 
Africa (CSSDCA) was adopted. The 
conference was held in Abuja from 
8th - 9th of May, 2000.  
 
The administration worked towards 
ensuring that the peace process in 
Sierra Leone, after Nigeria and 
ECOMOG‟s ending of the civil war, 
was being handled by the United 
Nations, thereby reducing Nigeria's 
financial commitment. Nigeria also 
ensured that its military contingents 
continued to feature prominently in 
the regional and international 
peacekeeping missions. These places 
included Sierra Leone, Guinea 
Bissau, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Burundi, 
Western Sahara and the Balkans. In 
the Mano River area, Nigeria 
continued to broker peace between 
Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in 
an attempt at ending the cycle of 
violence. In Sierra Leone for 
instance, Nigeria is playing a leading 
role in the task of reconstruction 
after years of civil war. Nigeria has 
also contributed the sum of 
$100,000 for the take-off of the 
Special Court to try war criminals 
(Obasanjo, oral interview, 2014).  
 
Nigeria was also largely responsible 
for the "thawing of the ice" in the 
potentially dangerous land crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The land crisis in that 
country was rightly identified as a 
potential flash point for conflict, 
which could engulf most of 
Southern Africa, with ramifications 
reaching far beyond the African 
continent. Through the 
instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth, the Abuja 
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Agreement was brokered, to break 
the logjam. To date, this Agreement 
remains the most creditable 
mechanism for resolving the 
Zimbabwean crisis (Obasanjo, 
2014).  
 
The administration demonstrated 
that it was committed to ensuring 
that peace reigned supreme on the 
African continent since peace and 
stability were the minimum 
conditions for any meaningful 
development (Obasanjo, 2014).  
 
Consular: Welfare of Nigerians 
In this regard, the Obasanjo 
administration articulated a new 
consular policy, which would be the 
guiding framework for Nigerian 
Missions in dealing with cases of 
Nigerian citizens abroad, 
irrespective of the circumstances of 
their departure from the country or 
their current immigration status 
abroad. Nigeria‟s diplomatic 
missions abroad emphasized to their 
host countries that the dignity of 
Nigerians must be respected; 
migrant workers of Nigerian origin 
protected and those trafficked be 
recognized as victims who must be 
assisted rather than be dehumanized.  
 
Indeed the policy also sought a share 
of the international labour market 
for Nigerian workers in almost all 
fields of endeavour. In that regard, 
Nigeria and a number of countries, 
notable Italy, Ireland and Spain 
concluded frameworks for 
cooperation on mutual and bilateral 
assistance on labour. This would 
enable Nigeria to provide manual 
labour (manpower) to countries that 
have signed the agreement 
(Obasanjo, 2014). 
 
Regional Integration 
Nigeria's conviction that integration 
of African economies could be 
accelerated through the proposed 
African Union, prompted the active 
support of the government in 
facilitating the eventual adoption of 
the treaty establishing the African 
Union. It was due to Obasanjo's 
intervention that the Heads of States 
adopted the Constitutive Act of the 
Union, during the Lome Summit in 
December 2000. Nigeria's support 
for the African Union was based on 
the belief that its character, content 
and form were in consonance with 
the cherished vision of the founding 
fathers of the OAU and the 
aspiration of Africans for the unity 
and prosperity of their peoples. The 
OAU was finally transformed into 
the African Union (AU) as well as 
the successful conclusion of the 
Durban Summit. It was Nigeria‟s 
belief that if the African Union lived 
up to its billing of becoming an 
instrument for political, economic 
and social transformation of the 
continent, then the ideals and 
aspirations of the founding fathers of 
the OAU of a united, strong and 
prosperous Africa would have been 
given vent (Obasanjo, 2014).  
 
The Obasanjo administration 
spearheaded the 'Fast Track' 
approach to integration in West 
Africa. At the 22nd Summit of 
ECOWAS Authority of Heads of 
States and Governments in Lome, 
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Togo, on December 9th, 1999, 
Nigeria made a landmark proposal 
for a fast track approach to 
integration of the sub-region. This 
process, which originally involved 
close economic collaborations with 
Ghana, has now expanded into the 
creation of a Free Trade Area 
involving Nigeria, Benin, Togo, 
Niger and Ghana. It also has resulted 
in considerable progress made in 
further integration of our currencies, 
transport and power systems 
(Obasanjo, 2014).  
What may appear to be the most 
outstanding achievement of Nigeria 
during the Obasanjo era in the area 
of sub-regional cooperation was the 
successful inauguration of the Gulf 
of Guinea Commission (GGC) in 
Libreville, Gabon in November, 
1999. The Gulf of Guinea 
Commission comprising Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Congo, DRC and Angola, 
has as its principal objective, the 
strengthening of economic and 
political cooperation among member 
states as well as the provision of a 
forum for cooperation within sub-
regional organizations such as 
ECOWAS and the Central African 
Economic Community (SEMAC). 
The final take-off of the GGC, 
eleven years after it was first 
proposed by Nigeria, was a major 
diplomatic victory for  
the country. The success record was 
largely due to the new democratic 
dispensation in the country and 
Nigeria‟s acknowledged leadership 
role in Africa (Obasanjo, 2014).  
 
Obasanjo's effort at cooperation was 
not limited to the African continent 
alone as it extended to the Third 
World through his chairmanship of 
the G77. As a chairman of the G77, 
during the year 2000, Nigeria 
successfully re-energized the group 
by convening a meeting at a Summit 
level meeting of the G77 for the first 
time in its 36 years of existence in 
Havana, Cuba on 12th April 2000 
(Obasanjo, 2014).  
 
As a chairman of the G77 in 2000, 
Obasanjo, together with former 
Libyan leader Mouamar Ghaddafi, 
proposed a South Healthcare 
Delivery Programme that was 
adopted at the Havana Summit of 
the group. The aim is to provide 
assistance to the Healthcare sector of 
the needy members of the G77. The 
Secretariat of the programme is 
based in Nigeria.  The programme 
formally took off in July 2002 with 
the first batch of volunteers heading 
for Chad, Burkina Faso, Sierra 
Leone and Niger. The budget for the 
programme was estimated at $21 
million and both Nigeria and Libya 
contributed about 50% of the budget 
while Cuba supported with 
thousands of medical staff 
(Obasanjo, 2014). 
 
Economic Achievements 
Perhaps, one of the most significant 
achievements of the Obasanjo 
presidency was Nigeria‟s exit from 
the foreign debts loop. According to 
Obasanjo (2014),  
when we paid off the debts, we 
drew a deep breath of satisfaction 
but we seemed to be on the road to 
the lender again. The Debt 
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Management Office, DMO, said we 
were under-borrowed. Now our 
debts were 14 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product, 16 percent 
below the internationally accepted 
threshold. We don't need to reach 
that threshold or to hold a 
colloquium on the evils of 
borrowing. Yes, we can use debts 
to bridge financial gaps when 
necessary but as the old saying 
goes, he who goes a-borrowing 
goes a-sorrowing, and saddles the 
future generation with debts it 
knew nothing about. Besides, debts 
must be tied to regenerative 
projects and they must be well 
managed to avoid corruption. In 
this country, we are not friendly 
with figures and I doubt if we ever 
knew exactly how much we were 
owing anybody. I am told that at 
one of the debt reconciliation 
meetings with the creditors, the 
Nigerian representative was asked 
to present his figures. He reportedly 
said: "let's have your figures 
because I am sure your figures are 
more accurate than ours." So, even 
though some critics thought at the 
time that Obasanjo was wasting 
money by paying the debts, I 
believed, and still believe, it was 
the right thing to do. Of course, I 
am not unaware of the fact that the 
present government is working out 
new guidelines to limit borrowing 
by the Federal and State 
Governments. In spite of that, we 
must keep the debt profile as low as 
possible” (Obasanjo, 2014).  
 
In an interview with Obasanjo, he 
asserted that the objective of what 
needed to be done determined steps 
to be taken on any issue while in 
power. With this assertion, it can be 
noted that there were no formal 
institutions immediately consulted in 
policymaking and implementation as 
situation determined what line of 
action to be taken. According to 
Akande (2001), the main 
achievement of the Obasanjo 
administration was mostly in the 
foreign affairs where the dented 
image of the country, caused by the 
past military governments had been 
at least taken care of. 
 
Also, in the words of Lamido 
(2014), “Obasanjo has clearly paid a 
lot of personal attention to foreign 
policy in the past as he has always 
done ( if Joe Garba‟s testimony in 
this in his book Diplomatic 
Soldiering) is anything to go by”.  
 
Obasanjo’s Foreign Policy: A 
Critique 
If the foregoing are anything to go 
by, one would give plaudits to 
Obasanjo for his foreign policy 
style, focus and exploits. Indeed, 
like the era of military rule, when he 
completed the Murtala Mohammed 
administration, a period regarded as 
the golden age of Nigeria‟s external 
relations, Obasanjo brought in a lot 
of experience, wittiness and 
dynamism into the making and 
implementation of Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy.  
 
However, there were certain 
drawbacks. A critical area was 
Obasanjo‟s seeming unpopular 
stance about driving foreign policy 
matters without carrying along the 
democratic structures and 
institutions central to it. He has been 
described as his own foreign affairs 
minister (Fawole, 2004; Saliu, 2006; 
Folarin, 2014). In a democracy, this 
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is not acceptable. The National 
Assembly for instance bitterly 
complained about Obasanjo‟s 
unilateral act in signing out Bakassi 
to Cameroon in 2006. These acts, 
like others, were regarded as a 
disregard for structures and 
institutions put in place for foreign 
policy making and implementation. 
 
Secondly, like Adebajo (2008) 
identifies, the Obasanjo civilian 
administration failed to revive the 
country‟s dilapidated infrastructure 
and electricity sector, and the 
country‟s oil refineries were 
producing less when he left office in 
2007 than when he was first elected 
in 1999. These were inimical to the 
objective of foreign direct 
investment.  
Furthermore, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) was accused of 
manipulation by Obasanjo to target 
his political opponents in a selective 
manner. Also, Obasanjo‟s 
unsuccessful and undignified 
attempt to change the Nigerian 
constitution in April 2006 to allow 
him, allegedly, to run for a third 
presidential term badly dented 
democratic credentials. Although 
these were not directly foreign 
policy issues, they nevertheless 
affected Nigeria‟s external image 
and Obasanjo‟s international 
personage as a statesman.  
 
Conclusion 
The Obasanjo era truly resented the 
second golden age of Nigeria‟s 
foreign policy. The first era was 
during the General Murtala 
Muhammad administration, which 
he (Obasanjo) continued after the 
assassination of the former, in an 
attempted military coup in 1976. 
Barring all shortcomings, Nigeria 
regained a position in global 
reckoning, enjoyed considerable 
foreign direct investment, bounced 
back in African leadership and 
transited smoothly democratically. 
 
However, for Nigeria‟s foreign 
policy to achieve its desired goals, 
proper institutions must be put in 
place and roles of the institutions 
must be properly defined. Skillful 
personnel should man these 
institutions and career diplomats 
alone be appointed for diplomatic 
missions. These would put the 
machines of external diplomacy 
vibrant and effusive. The anticipated 
results would become realizable.  
 
Although policymaking and 
implementation with little recourse 
to multiple institutions and offices 
have its own merits (which include 
quick decision making and 
implementation); but it may not be 
cost-effective in the long run 
because of the tendency for 
unilateral and arbitrary to 
boomerang.
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